2,000 Greater & Lesser Mysteries/2,000 Greater and Lesser Mysteries.iso/govern/fbi/mys00750.txt

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July 1990


            CONFRONTING THE TERRORIST HOSTAGE TAKER

                              By

                      G. Dwayne Fuselier
     Special Agent, Special Operations and Research Unit
                         FBI Academy
                              and
                        Gary W. Noesner
   Special Agent, FBI, Washington Metropolitan Field Office


    ``For the foreseeable future, terrorism, both domestic and
international, will continue to be a major concern to U.S.
Government and law enforcement agencies.'' (1)  Concern over
terrorism is consistently voiced by officers attending the FBI
National Academy in Quantico, Virginia.  Some officers have the
impression that in a terrorist hostage incident, the crisis
management approach would (or should) be substantially different
from that in a criminal hostage incident.  This is not the case.

     Since the mid-1970s, the FBI has grouped hostage taking
incidents into four broad categories--the terrorist, the prison
situation, the criminal, and the mentally disturbed.  State and
local law enforcement officers at the FBI Academy have indicated
that these four major categories are still commonly used by law
enforcement agencies. (2)  Further, there is also the consensus
that the current set of negotiation strategies and tactics
available to law enforcement provides viable alternatives from
which to choose, whatever the motivation for the taking of
hostages. (3)

     Unfortunately, much of what is believed about terrorist
conduct and behavior is derived from the media and the
entertainment industry.  Both the general population and the law
enforcement community have come to accept the terrorist
stereotype as accurately depicting personality traits,
dedication, sophistication, commitment, and modus operandi.

     All too often, the dramatic events surrounding a terrorist
incident are misrepresented in fictional accounts or in media
efforts aimed at recreating actual situations that have
occurred.  Further, a brief news flash, broadcasted during an
ongoing terrorist siege, does not draw an accurate picture of a
terrorist's total range of conduct and personality traits.
Therefore, many of the expressed ideas regarding terrorists
appear to be based upon incorrect perceptions.

The Terrorist Hostage Taker

     The FBI defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social goals. (4)  One major
difficulty in discussing the terrorist hostage taker is that the
words ``terrorist'' and ``terrorism'' have been used by the
media to such an extent that they are virtually useless as valid
descriptive terms.  They have become political terms with almost
as many definitions as speakers.

     From the viewpoint of the crisis manager (i.e., the on-scene
commander), does it help to distinguish a hostage taking as a
terrorist act, separate from a criminal act?  No, it does not.
The label given the behavior does not change the act.  In fact,
the FBI now refers to such acts as ``terrorist crimes'' to
underscore the fact that the motivation for the behavior does not
change the criminality of such behavior.  The emphasis here is
not meant to imply a lesser risk but to stress that the act is,
first and foremost, a violent crime in progress, regardless of
the stated motivation of the hostage taker.

     Too often, those who are quick to point out that an act is a
``terrorist incident'' (or any other kind, for that matter)
mistakenly confuse the labeling with understanding.  In this
case, the label is one that is so subjective that it is
meaningless.  To describe an incident as only a ``terrorist''
event implies that all such events are similar.  Even additional
adjectives, such as ``Palestinian'' terrorists, fail to identify,
for example, significant differences in motives, methods, and
goals of the various Palestinian factions, and of course,
individual differences among the members themselves.

     The use of a label is helpful only if the term is associated
with essential elements that differentiate one set of behaviors
from another.  Perhaps a more-descriptive term would be ``planned
political/ religious'' hostage taking, since this term does not
have the emotional overtones currently attached to the word
``terrorist.'' Such a term avoids the automatic, and potentially
misleading, assumptions made when the word ``terrorist'' is
used.

     The essential question is:  In confronting such an incident,
will law enforcement agencies employ crisis management techniques
that have been used successfully in a wide variety of
hostage/barricade situations, or will those procedures be
discarded as a result of faulty assumptions of how terrorists are
supposed to behave?  Popular perceptions regarding terrorists
would lead us to believe that they comprise a unique and specific
personality type, and that terrorists are to be differentiated
from the wide range of criminal and mentally disturbed
personalities more frequently observed by law enforcement crisis
managers.  To our knowledge, no scientific studies or analytical
surveys exist that might serve to provide the basis for such a
belief.  In order to examine the validity of current crisis
management/negotiation techniques in confronting such incidents,
it is essential to separate common myth from factual knowledge.

The Terrorist Mystique

     In a planned political/religious incident, the subjects
typically take hostages with the intent of getting publicity for
their cause, and in some cases, to demand the release of
imprisoned group members.  The fact that these are planned rather
than spontaneous hostage takings indicates an increased
likelihood of outside moral and/or operational support and
creates a virtual certainty of extensive media coverage.

     It appears that some political and religious extremists,
particularly in the Middle East, have been successful in one very
basic way--they have generated an extreme interest and concern
for their activities among Western law enforcement officers.
Former Chinese Communist party leader Mao Tse Tung maintained
that terrorists should kill one to influence a thousand, and some
radical Palestinian groups and extremist Lebanese Shia (e.g.,
Hizballah) seem to have accomplished this.

     However, in an article reviewing the terrorist psychosocial
profile, Strentz concludes that terrorist groups (particularly
those of Middle Eastern origin) have changed dramatically. (5)
Contrasting left-wing Middle Eastern groups of the 1980s to those
groups active a decade earlier, he found the more recent Middle
Eastern groups to be poorly educated, unskilled, unemployed,
illiterate, undisciplined, and ill-trained.  Does this mean that
a planned political/religious hostage incident is not dangerous?
Obviously not.  As Strentz notes, ``While one should never
consciously underestimate adversaries, neither should one make
them into supermen.  They are a force to be reckoned with, but
must be viewed within the perspective of reality.'' (6)

     Beginning in 1985, the FBI began investigating violations of
the Hostage Taking Statute (Title 18, USC, Section 1203) and in
1986, the Overseas Homicide/Attempted Homicide Statute (Title 18,
USC, Section 2331).  These statutes provided for the first time
the investigative vehicle through which FBI Special Agents could
actively and aggressively respond to major terrorist incidents
abroad wherein American citizens and property were the victims.

     Starting with the June 14, 1985, hijacking of TWA Flight
847, FBI Special Agents came into direct contact with a number of
American victims.  Through detailed debriefings in pursuit of
criminal prosecution, they collected a large volume of data
concerning observed terrorist behavior.  Subsequent FBI victim
debriefings and interviews of incarcerated terrorists involved in
almost all of the planned political/religious incidents that
have occurred during the second half of the 1980s expanded this
database significantly. (7)

     Understandably, the information-gathering process during
this investigative activity was not designed as an orderly
scientific examination that would provide the basis for
personality assessments.  Rather, it aimed at developing
evidentiary material.  Nonetheless, relying on these interviews,
and on the experience and observation of FBI Agents, a clearer
and more accurate picture of terrorist behavior can be drawn.
This picture should serve to demystify the terrorist, to separate
fact from fiction, and to support the position that decades of
significant crisis management experience in a variety of
circumstances has prepared American law enforcement to deal with
a political/religious hostage incident.

     It appears that the average terrorist is not as
sophisticated as is commonly believed.  Terrorist interviews and
victim debriefings show that most of the terrorists of the 1980s
received very marginal training prior to deployment for an
operation.  They were provided with only a minimal set of
instructions as to how to conduct themselves during an operation.
And while these terrorists may have been given a list of demands,
for the most part, they were not trained to negotiate with
authorities to achieve those demands.

     In the course of the FBI's investigations, it became evident
that these subjects are seldom prepared to deal with the unknown
variables and unforeseen changes that routinely play an integral
part in such sieges.  As a general rule (and more specifically
applicable to Middle Eastern subjects), the terrorists are young
males with little or no formal education.  These individuals come
from deprived economic conditions and are without any significant
positive work experience.  Contrary to popular notion, they do
not employ sophisticated false documentation or disguises and
most certainly do not fit the ``jet set'' multilingual, worldly,
and savvy profile so often projected in popular literature.

     For example, before going to Italy to initiate the October
1985, Achille Lauro incident, the four young terrorists involved
never traveled outside of Lebanon. Only one spoke a second
language.  They received little training, were afforded only
minimal instructions regarding their mission, and traveled on
Scandinavian passports.  These terrorists stood out as four young
Arab males aboard a ship populated almost entirely by elderly
American and European tourists.  Once the operation began, they
were confronted with unexpected responses from government
officials.  This put them in a panic, since they failed to
prepare contingency plans and could not adapt to the
circumstances.

     During the September 1986, hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in
Karachi, the four terrorists who boarded the Boeing 747
immediately rushed to the front of the aircraft looking for the
cockpit in order to gain control of the crew.  They were
dumbfounded when they discovered the cockpit was not located at
the nose of the aircraft, as anticipated. They did not know that
a Boeing 747's cockpit could only be reached by ascending a
stairway located at the rear of the first class cabin.  This
delay allowed the cockpit crew to escape.

     The April 1988, hijacking of Kuwaiti Flight 422 has been
cited as demonstrating terrorist sophistication.  However, during
this incident, when Beirut International Airport controllers
denied landing clearance and blocked the runway, one terrorist
demanded the pilot land in the ocean and taxi from there onto the
land.  When the pilot argued that such a maneuver was impossible,
the terrorist displayed the plastic safety card found in the back
of all passenger seats and pointed to a drawing depicting a
floating aircraft with passengers exiting and gathering on
flotation equipment.  The terrorist firmly believed that this
picture proved that the aircraft could land in the water, float,
and then be driven onto land.

     Such incidents clearly do not support the popular belief
that all terrorists undergo extensive and detailed aircraft
hijack training at so-called ``desert terrorist academies.''
However, these examples should not suggest that
political/religious hostage takers are harmless or incompetent.
These subjects, like all hostage takers, should be treated with
the utmost caution and respect.  These unsophisticated,
uneducated, and ill-trained young men have killed many innocent
victims.  Indeed, they probably should be considered even more
dangerous because of their inadequate preparation and the acts of
violence they tend to commit when their plans do not materialize.

The Law Enforcement Response

     One question frequently asked by police officers during
training sessions is, ``How would you negotiate differently
during a terrorist incident?''  Once the distinction is made
between kidnapping (where the location of subject and victim are
typically unknown) and hostage taking (where the subject and
victim are contained within a police perimeter), officers are
surprised (or perhaps disappointed) to hear the answer.
Basically, negotiation strategies and tactics for terrorist
incidents are identical to those that would be used during any
hostage or barricade incident, regardless of the political or
religious backgrounds of the subjects.

     Simply stated, there are a finite number of strategies (and
particular tactics to support each of those strategies) to choose
from when negotiating with hostage takers that are contained and
isolated.  The fact that a particular group of subjects puts
forth political or religious reasons for taking hostages does not
call into play a conceptually different set of strategies.  The
negotiation team assesses the motives, demands, and behaviors of
these hostage takers and makes recommendations to the on-scene
commander as to the most appropriate strategy, drawn from the
same set of possibilities as in any other hostage incident.

     However, the specific factors the team considers crucial to
a particular incident, in all cases, depends on the
circumstances of the hostage taking.  For example, suppose a
person, claiming harassment and persecution by Federal
authorities who are stealing thoughts from his mind, took
hostages in a public office building and threatened to kill the
hostages unless the FBI stopped the persecution.  The
negotiation team would logically focus on the subject's medical
history, seeking records of past treatment for mental
disturbance, interviewing any mental health professional (MHP)
who may have treated the subject, and perhaps using the MHP as a
consultant.  On the other hand, if a group of subjects took the
same hostages in the same building, but claimed to represent the
``People's Holy Liberation Forces,'' the team would certainly
value any information on the origins, composition, and any
previous actions by this group.  Knowledgeable sources on both
the political and religious dogma of the group, as well as
language experts, would be consulted and perhaps incorporated
into the negotiation team.  As one can see, the process of
assessment and recommendation remains the same, but clearly the
specific factors or issues that the team considers critical vary
with each incident.

     This is not to say that when a politically motivated
incident occurs in the United States, there is not a greater
amount of involvement by the higher levels of the U.S.
Government, because there is.  In fact, ``The desire of
terrorists, both international and domestic, to focus media
attention on their causes by staging attacks at locations or
events of international interest has made it necessary for
governmental and law enforcement authorities to closely
coordinate their preparations for special events.'' (8)  That
involvement, however, does not call into play ``better,'' or
even different, negotiation strategies or principles.  The
negotiation recommendations are simply reviewed by a longer
chain of command.

     Even as long as 12 years ago, Stratton stated that social,
political or religious terrorists are the most difficult to deal
with because of their commitment. (9)  However, he also pointed out
that negotiation with political/religious hostage takers has
been successful.

     When hostage takers plan to be surrounded, as in the
takeover of a public building, the probability of a prolonged
incident increases and the risk to the hostages is considered to
be very high.  However, notwithstanding the fact that such an
incident was deliberately planned, the commitment of the hostage
takers may not be a ``total'' commitment.  Post-incident review
of the behavior of some of the hostage takers in planned
political incidents indicates that there may be a difference in
being ``willing'' to die for a cause and in ``wanting'' to die
for a cause.  Once the subject has been away from a support
system for days or weeks and emotional and physical exhaustion
sets in, that person may be more willing to accept the rationale
presented by the negotiator.

     Political hostage takers have been negotiated with
effectively by stressing that their point has been made, their
demands have been heard, their cause has been ``aired'' to the
world, and therefore, killing hostages would only serve to
discredit them and their cause in the eyes of the public.  One
author concludes that police negotiating tactics are most likely
to succeed in planned, political/religious situations if the
subjects are primarily interested in making a symbolic statement
and obtaining publicity. (10)  These negotiation tactics have, in
fact, been successful in resolving a number of planned
political/religious hostage incidents in the United States and
elsewhere. (11)  Even incidents that required a tactical
resolution, such as the siege at the Iranian Embassy in London in
April 1981, confirmed the appropriateness of these negotiating
techniques.

Conclusion

     The dangers posed by planned political/religious hostage
taking incidents should in no way be minimized.  Rather, law
enforcement should respond to these incidents in a manner that
is consistent with the crisis management procedures that have
been developed and validated through thousands of
hostage/barricade situations worldwide.

     If political/religious situations are accorded special
status or are the cause for law enforcement to ignore effective
crisis management strategies, then law enforcement falls victim
to the ``terrorist mystique'' that has allowed terrorism to
become a potent weapon in recent years.  However, if a planned
political/religious incident is not treated as a special case,
and  hostage takers instead are dealt with as any other high-risk
subject would be, then law enforcement will be better able to
employ the professional skills learned through the lessons of the
past years.

FOOTNOTES

(1)   Oliver B. Revell, Terrorism:  A Law Enforcement Perspective
(Washington, DC:  U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1988).

(2)   Statements received from officers attending negotiation
classes conducted by the Special Operations and Research Unit at
the FBI Academy.

(3)   Participants from major U.S. cities, England, Germany, and
Hong Kong during an advanced hostage negotiation seminar held at
the FBI Academy in February 1989.

(4)   FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States,
1986, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Terrorist Research and
Analytical Center, Washington, D.C., 1986.

(5)   Thomas Strentz, ``A Terrorist Psychosocial Profile:  Past
and Present,'' FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, April 1987, pp.
13-19.

(6)   Ibid.

(7)   Incidents included the Achille Lauro hijacking, the
EgyptAir hijacking in Malta, the Rome and Vienna airport attacks,
the bombing of TWA Flight 840, the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73
in Karachi, Pakistan, The Royal Jordanian Airline hijacking, the
hijacking of Kuwaiti Flights 221 and 422, and dozens of attacks
directed against American diplomats and citizens worldwide.

(8)   Supra note 1.

(9)   John Stratton, ``The Terrorist Act of Hostage Taking:  A
View of Violence and the Perpetrators,'' Police Science and
Administration, vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1-9.

(10)  A.H. Miller, Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations (Boulder,
Colorado:  Westview Press, 1980).

(11)  Incidents included the seizure of a train by South
Moluccans in the Netherlands in December 1975; the Balcombe
Street siege by IRA members in London in December 1975; the
hijacking of TWA Flight 355 by Croatians in September 1976,
finally resolved in Paris; the Hanafi Muslim siege of three
buildings in Washington, D.C., in March 1977; the hostage taking
by Croatians at the West German Consulate in Chicago, Illinois,
in August 1978; the takeover of the Turkish Embassy by Armenians
in Ottawa, Canada, in March 1985; and the Oakdale, Louisiana,
and Atlanta, Georgia, prison sieges by Cuban inmates in
November/December 1987.